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Three important myths about Soviet nationality policy have been 
exploded since 1988. Most Soviet scholars and Western scholars admit 
that, contrary to Marxist-Leninist postulates, ethnic consciousness 
does not necessarily decline as society moves toward modernization or 
"socialism." In recent years in the U.S.S.R. ethnic consciousness has 
greatly expanded or surfaced. Second, the assertion that "druzhba 
narodov" (friendship of the peoples) is characteristic of Soviet society 
is belied by the death of over a thousand people in inter-ethnic clashes, 
the wounding of more than 8,000, and the displacement of about a 
half-million others as a result of clashes in the Caucasus and Central 
Asia. The third myth is that of an "unshakeable union of free re- 
publics," exploded by declarations of sovereignty and independence by 
almost all republics. Soviet analysts and even politicians have had to 
admit that the cliches about the Soviet multiethnic society being of a 
"wholly different kind" and the emergence of a "Soviet nation" were 
exercises in self-deception and propaganda. As is so often the case in 
the age of glasnost', past falsifications are overcompensated for by 
sometimes excessive breast-beating and self-criticism. Thus, the articles 
by Prazauskas, Tishkov, and Yamskov are to be welcomed for their 
critical but balanced assessments and for their attention to the facts. 
Dr. Prazauskas's article is an attempt to generalize from Soviet experi- 
ence in order to make broader statements about ethnopolitics. How- 
ever, it is not tested against enough cases, and it closely follows, in 
abstract and general terms, the specifics of Soviet experience. Like Dr. 
Tishkov, Prazauskas sees the solution to ethnic problems in democracy 
and a rejection of authoritarianism. Although it is hard to argue with 
that, we need to remember that democracies such as Canada, Belgium, 
Israel, and the United States have not "solved" the ethnic "problem," 
though they have been relatively successful in managing it so that their 
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states have not disintegrated. Where Prazauskas and Tishkov differ is 
that the former believes that the Soviet Union contains many signifi- 
cantly different political cultures and that therefore it is very difficult to 
establish compatible patterns of behavior and rules of the game among 
the different political cultures, which overlap to a considerable extent 
with ethnic cultures. 
Tishkov is much more sanguine about the compatibility of ethnic cul- 
tures, and stresses the potential for developing new political institutions 
that will allow different peoples to express themselves. He sees nation- 
alist expression as a substitute for unfettered political life, the implica- 
tion being that once the latter is achieved the former will no longer be 
necessary. By contrast, Prazauskas explicitly rejects "The attempt to 
establish individual equality" at the basis of "civil society" as a solution 
to nationality problems because, as he sees it, this merely separates 
individuals from their national groups. In effect, this is nothing but "the 
assimilation of minorities by the dominant ethnic group that serves as 
an integrative core." This would only exacerbate, not solve, the crisis of 
the nationalities. 
Prazauskas probably exaggerates the degree of difference in the politi- 
cal cultures of the nationalities, and his claim that in 70 years the politi- 
cal cultures of the Slavic peoples and the "peripheral nationalities" have 
not drawn closer together needs empirical support. Moreover, it is not 
clear that the pre-Soviet political cultures of the Baltic peoples, Mol- 
davians, Ukrainians, Central Asians, or peoples of the Caucasus were 
any less authoritarian than those of the Slavs. Prazauskas argues that 
local interethnic conflicts actually serve the interests of the anti-reform- 
ist bureaucracy because they allow the imposition of selective authori- 
tarianism. Ulitmately, he agrees with Tishkov that the only guarantor of 
regulating interethnic conflicts is democracy, but he states that a demo- 
cratic Russia is crucial. 
Tishkov, on the other hand, hints that Russia herself suffered from the 
policies of preference "for previously backward peoples" and that the 
lack of political democracy, not Russian oppression, is the cause of the 
nationalities' troubles. Tishkov rejects self-determination of nations as 
a practical solution because the nations of the U.S.S.R. are so inter- 
mingled with each other that self-determination might well lead to the 
tyranny of national majorities. He shifts the focus from nations to the 
individual and, unlike Prazauskas, advocates the maintenance of the 
Soviet Union, which he sees as being in accord with European tenden- 
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cies to inter-national integration. Tishkov advocates the abolition of 
individual national identification and any discrimination based on 
nationality. Clearly, this would lead many people to drop their national 
identification and hope to be associated with other nationalities. For 
example, Ukrainians living in Russia or Jews living in Ukraine might 
well choose to lose their ethnic identities. And yet, Tishkov suggests 
that cultural autonomy for the nationalities be broadened and new 
sovereign state units be permitted to form. There is no contradiction 
here if one assumes that the basic principle is individual choice: those 
who wish would be able to lose their national identities, whereas those 
who wish to strengthen those identities and cultures would be able to 
do so in both the cultural and political arenas. Tishkov's argument is a 
challenge to the advocates of non-Russian national causes: let us put 
the nationalists' claims to the test by giving individuals democracy and 
the fight to assign their freely chosen priority to their national identifi- 
cations. 
A. N. Yamskov's study of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict alerts the 
Western reader to dimensions not usually mentioned in the secondary 
literature, notably the demographic and economic. These seem to 
explain more than historical or religious considerations. Yamskov's 
study is a fine example of how valuable Soviet analyses can be when 
freed of ideologically determined dogmas and shibboleths. 
Not surprisingly, there is no consensus among the authors on a formula 
for the solution of the Soviet Union's current problems in relation to 
nationalities. This is as it should be, because no magic formula exists. 
The best any multi-ethnic state can do is to manage, not "solve," ethnic 
issues. It should construct a system to accommodate, not deny or sup- 
press, ethnopolitics, and it should institutionalize consensual mechan- 
isms for resolving disputes. Secondly, the state should provide for equal 
individual and collective rights, monitor their implementation, and try 
as best it can to be evenhanded in that implementation - and be per- 
ceived as such. Thirdly, the state should educate its citizens to attitudes 
such as mutual respect, tolerance, and appreciation of cultural diversi- 
ty. One of the negative lessons learned from the Soviet experience is 
that the state should not attempt to define ethnic groups and assign 
membership to them, nor should the state consistently favor one group 
over another. 
All of these are difficult to achieve, particularly when over seven 
decades bad habits were learned. Tishkov's advocacy of democratiza- 
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tion is well taken and is a great enough challenge for the Soviet Union. 
It is doubtful whether it is sufficient to "solve" the nationalities 
problem, because many people will not be satisfied with individual 
rights but will press for the achievement of their group as well. Democ- 
racy will not make ethnopolitics disappear, but it could make it man- 
ageable. 
